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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is basically a contract action wherein Plaintiff ordered certain electrical heaters from Defendant Brown
who in turn ordered said heaters from Defendant Mallory; the
heaters were claimed to be defective.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried by the Court, sitting without
a jury, commencing on January 19, 1976, and continuing through
until January 29, 1976, for a total of seven days of actual
trial.

Pursuant to stipulation, the case was tried first as

to the issue of liability and second as to the issue of damages.
Upon completion of the evidence on liability, the
Court made the

definite

ruling

that Mallory did not

get what it thought i t was going to get with respect to the
heaters, and that the preponderance of the evidence

showed

that Valad was required to furnish a certain type of heater
which it did not furnish.

(T. 620)

At the beginning of the

next day, however, the Court reversed itself and said that it
had not intended to rule absolutely that Valad was liable despite the specific statement so made (T. 620, lns. 23-29), but
that the Court did want to have post-trial briefs on the matter.
The Court also indicated at the beginning of the bifurcated
portion of the trial on damages, that the burden of persuasion
was on Valad, not Mallory, the Plaintiff:
As between the Plaintiff and the Defendant
Valad, I indicated in chambers that I felt
that the burden of persuasion in view of
my rulings, would be upon Valad to persuade
me that they were not liable.
(T. 631-2)
At the conclusion of the trial, the Court took the
matter under advisement and all counsel submitted post-trial
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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briefs, which are found in the record.

Subsequently, Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law as well as a Judgment were filed
by the Plaintiff; Defendant Valad filed objections to the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Motion for a New
Trial.

On April 5, 1977, all counsel met with Judge Taylor

in chambers and agreed to certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as to form, and further agreed that the Judgment would be amended to conform to the revised Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.

(R. 641)

In the second appeal on this matter, Supreme Court
No. 15544, issues are presented

which bear no relevance to

Valad's appeal and concern only Mallory and Brown.
NOTE:
as follows:

The relevant abbreviations used herein are

Record--"R."; Transcript--"T."; line or lines--

"lns."; Exhibit--"Ex. or Exs."; Purchase Order--"P.O."; kilowatt--"KW";

paragraph--"~!";

and drawing--"DWG".

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant, Valad Electric Heating Corporation,
seeks reversal of the judgment of the lower Court in favor of
Mallory and/or Brown.

Appellant Valad further seeks judgment

on its Counterclaim against Brown in the sum of $4,837.50.
In the alternative, Valad seeks that its Motion for a New Trial '
be granted, and that the Court order a new trial on all of the
issues in this case.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Parties
Plaintiff, Mallory Engineering, Inc.,

(hereinafter

"Mallory"), whose principal office is located in Salt Lake
City,

Utah, designs and manufactures environmental equip-

ment "very similar to the three projects that are under consideration in this Court case", according to it's president,
Lee Farber.
Inc.,

(T. 4)

Defendant Ted R. Brown and Associates,

(hereinafter "Brown") , is a firm of engineering consul-

tants located in Salt Lake City, Utah, which ordered certain
industrial heaters from Valad for the purpose of selling them
to Mallory.

Valad Electric Heating Corporation (hereinafter

"Valad"), is a manufacturer and designer of electric heaters
and industrial heating equipment.
are located in Tarrytown, New York.

It's only office and plant
(T. 357-8)

Principal Characters
The persons primarily involved in the negotiations
for the parties were:
A.

Lee Farber, president of Mallory:

Farber is a qualified mechanical engineer.

(T. 3-4)

Mr.
Mr.

Farber did almost all of the negotiating with Brown's Carl
Nyman for the purchase of the heaters.
B.

Carl Nyman, Brown's engineer:

The only

person who negotiated on behalf of Brown was Carl Nyman, a
qualified electrical engineer.

(T. 226)

Mr. Nyman negoti-

ated with both Mallory's Farber and Valad's Cecchini.

c.

Peter Cecchini, Valad's General Manager:

All of the negotiations with respect to the order of the
heaters by Brown were carried on by Peter Cecchini, Valad's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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General Manager.

Mr. Cecchini does not hold any technical

engineering degrees such as Farber or Nyman, but has a degree
in "industrial engineering", which deals generally with plant
layout and business management of industrial plants, etc.
(T. 356, 499)
Jurisdictional Contacts
Peter Cecchini's uncontradicted testimony at trial
indicated that Valad had no employees, representatives, branch
offices, or other sales contacts in the State of Utah.
(T. 360)

Further facts with respect to the validity of per-

sonal jurisdiction over Valad are set forth in Point I below.
Preliminary Negotiations
Beginning in January, 1972,

(T. 358, 362) Brown

sought out manufacturers of heating equipment which it wanted
to buy in order to sell them to Mallory.
22)

(T. 75, 358-60, 219-

The latter had purchased similar heaters from companies

other than Valad.

(T. 14, 33)

After consulting Peter Cecchini

of Valad (T. 385) and Valad's advertising leaflets in Noveml:er,
(T. 97-

1972, Brown eventually chose to negotiate with Valad

99; Exs. 42 and 45) with whom it had never before dealt commercialiy.

Thereafter, the extended preliminary negotiations

leading to the eventual written contract to sell (Ex. 20)
between Valad and Brown were conducted entirely by them.
(T. 74, 240-42, 252-75, 326-32, 351-2, 358-9, 364-400)
Mallory's Governmental Contracts
Mallory's Lee Farber testified that he had certain
contract commitments to build mobile environmental chambers
designed to test ammunition, weaponry, etc.

(T. 4)

Mallory

needed heaters for the purpose of raising the temperature in
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these environmental chambers.

(T. 4)

During 1972, Farber

and Nyman negotiated for the purchase of various heaters.
The evidence is conflicting with respect to whether or not
Nyman read the basic government documents or had knowledge of
Mallory's specific heater needs.
6, 430-2)

(T. 6, 7, 10, 13, 101, 195-

However, it is not contested that Valad never re-

ceived copies of the government specifications.
430-2)

(T. 6-10, 13,

Further facts with respect to the government specifi-

cations appear in Point V below.
Relationship Between The Parties
The Record clearly establishes that Brown was
Mallory's vendor and Mallory was the vendee.

(T. 97)

Simil-

arly, Brown and Valad had the relationship of Vendor-Vendee.
(T. 20, 23, 25-6, 28, 220-21, 235, 254-5, 281)

There was

no contractual relationship between Mallory and Valad.

Mal-

lory seeks to hold Valad only on a third-party beneficiary theory
and the theory of guarantees.

(Conclusion of Law No. 5)

Fur-

ther facts with respect to the relationship of the parties
appear in Point II below.
Valad's Three Classes of Heaters
Cecchini's uncontradicted testimony showed that
Valad manufactured three types of heaters.

(T. 426-30)

The

three types are:
Class A:

Stock-Items, mass produced, repetitive;

heaters of various Valad designs; all advertised in it's
catalog.

(T. 426-7, 436)
Class B:

Modified stock heaters with the same fun-

damental theory, design and structure as stock items but modiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fied in size or shape for a customer's particular needs.
(T. 427-30. 436-7, 475-6, 492-6)
Class C:

Specially designed or custom-made heaters,

expressly guaranteed to meet the customers' special requirements
for performance.

(T. 427-8, 431, 437, 481, 524-5)

The heaters involved in this litigation fall into
the Class B only.

(T. 429-30)

Additional facts regarding

the significance of the classes of heaters appear in Point II
below.
Of fer And Acceptance
The initial negotiations between Cecchini and Nyman,
with respect to the purchase of the heaters by Brown, resulted
in Brown's P.O. 6730 for the 15 and 21 KW heaters.
and 11)

(Exs. 10

This purchase order from Brown included a copy of

a purchase order from Mallory to Brown, Mallory's P.O. 4016.
(Ex. 9)

These were not detailed enough to constitute a spe-

cific offer capable of acceptance by a manufacturer and were
not accepted by Valad.

On the basis of negotiations and

discussions after those purchase orders, Valad presented
Brown with detailed structural shop drawings for the 15 and 21
KW heaters.

(Exs. 17 and 18)

These constituted Valad's

specific offer for the manufacture of the heaters.
and Farber reviewed these drawings

Nyman

(the revised number 17

and the new 18), made certain modifications and approved
them.

This approval was written on both drawings, cons ti tu ting

Exhibit 20

(of which Exhibit 83 is the original), in Nyman's

handwriting, by the words:

"Approved for construction".

Thus, Exhibits 20 and 83 became

the only contract in the

case between Valad and Brown.
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Shipment Of The Heaters And Problems
Sometime after the speed letter of January 26, 1973,
arrived (Ex. 20), Valad began manufacturing the heaters and
shipped the same in mid and late March, 1973.
Exs. 36 and 37)

(T. 36, 713,

Valad manufactured the 12 KW heaters repre-

sented by Mallory P.O. 4047
issue in this case.

(Ex. 12), and these are not at

Valad never agreed to manufacture the 50

and 36 KW heaters and the record is devoid of any evidence that
such were accepted.
Mallory installed the heaters after receipt in late
March or early April and indicated its dissatisfactions to
Brown's Nyman on or about April 30, 1973.

(T. 241, 75, 415)

At that point, Mallory got in touch with Valad for the first
time

(T. 74-5), and several conversations were held.

The

result of these conversations was Mallory's repudiation of
any further contract with Valad, specifically for the 36 and
50 KW heaters.

(Ex. 35)

Additional facts with respect to the

time sequence of the significant and relevant events in this
case appear below.
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POINT I
THE COURT DOES NOT HAVE PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT VALAD
UNDER THE "LONG AR..'1" STATUTE, U.C.A.
1953 §§78-27-22 THROUGH 25.
NOR
HAS DEFENDANT VALAD MADE A GENERAL
APPEARANCE OR IN ANY OTHER WAY SUBJECTED ITSELF TO THE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURT.
There can be no valid judgment against Valad since
the Court in the first instance never had personal jurisdiction over Valad.

The Complaint herein was filed on September

20, 1973, and purportedly served upon Valad pursuant to the
provisions of the Long Arm Statute (U.C.A. 1953 §§78-27-22
through 24)

in New York.

(R. 9, 11)

On November 1, 1973,

Valad responded pro se with a single, "blue backed" document
(filed as one document in the Salt Lake County Clerk's office),
and consisting of two parts:
A. A document entitled "Answer, Counterclaim,
and Cross-Complaint" (R. 23) which was actually a
response to Defendant Brown's Cross-Complaint; and
B.
A document entitled "Answer" (R. 24-33),
which raised all of the jurisdictional defenses.
(R. 25-27)
The Lower Court And First Appeal
On April 14, 1975, Defendant Val ad filed a "special
appearance"

(R. 125-6) and an Affidavit (R. 137-141) , treated

by the Court as a Motion to Quash Service
and 170), and denied on April 28, 1975.

of Summons (R. 142
(R. 170)

Valad's affidavit is very significant to this case.
(R. 137-141)

It specifically denied the presence of agents,

sales, offices, bank accounts, advertising and any other significant contact in Utah.
to be isolated.

It shows the disputed transaction

The allegations contained in the affidavit

therein
have never been contested, challenged or disproven,
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either on the previous appeal or at trial.
The Remittitur
Defendant Valad filed a Notice of Appeal on May
12, 1975 (R. 173), followed by a Petition for Interlocutory
Appeal on May 23, 1975 (Supreme Court No. 14102).

The Inter-

locutory Appeal was sought due to Brown's filing of a Motion
to Dismiss.

(Supreme Court No. 14102)

Via the Remittitur on June 2, 1975, the Court grantai
Brown's Motion to Dismiss the Appeal but specifically reserved
the issue of personal jurisdiction for any ultimate appeal
in the matter.

(R. 178)

That same Remittitur, by its own

terms, rendered the interlocutory appeal of Valad moot.
(R. 178)
Testimony At Trial
During the trial, the following testimony came in
unchallenged and unrefuted:
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

(Schmidt, Attorney for Valad) :
Did you
ever have a sales representative in the
State of Utah?
(Valad's Cecchini): No, never.
Did you ever before do business in the
State of Utah?
No.
How many transactions, if you can remember
the number, did you have with Ted R, Brown
where you actually received purchase orders
from them?
Before this?
Before this case.
None.
So that the only purchase orders you ever
received from Ted R. Brown were those involved
in this present litigation?
Yes.
That is correct.
You have no branch office in the State of Utah?
None.
You never did?
(T. 360)
No.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

Lack Of Minimum Contacts In Utah
The line of cases beginning with Hill v. Zale, 25
Utah 2d 357, 482 P. 2d 332
of "long arm"

(1971), clearly defines the limits

jurisdiction in Utah.

statutes, U.C.A. 1953 §78-27-22 et

Hill says that the Utah
seq., require the "trans-

action of business" or "doing business" within the state in
order to subject a nonresident corporation to the jurisdiction
of 0ur Courts.

Id. at 333.

The "doing business" test was

met by the analysis of a number of factors such as the
presence of local offices, personnel, continuous, systematic
activity, etc.,

"none of which is alone the sine qua non to

establish a business presence in the state."
at 482 P. 2d at 334)

(See the list

None of the parties to this action

have alleged in the complaints or elsewhere, that Valad had
any of the contacts required by Hill v. Zale.
5,

~ill;

(R.

4, UO;

etc.)
There are no cases in Utah or elsewhere which

predicate jurisdiction on finding of such "minimum contacts"
as Valad's in Utah.

The analysis of Hill v. Zale has been

applied over and over again since 1971 to deny jurisdiction
against a defendant in Valad's position.

See Union Ski

Company v. Union Plastics Corp., 548 P. 2d 1257 (Utah 1976),
wherein the Court stated that the burden was on the Plaintiff
to affirmatively demonstrate that the Defendant comes within
the requirements set forth in Hill.

(548 P. 2d at 1259)

See also Packaging Corporation of America v. Morris, 561
P.

2d 680

(Utah 1977); and Hodge v. Sands Manufacturing Co.,

150 S.E. 2d 793 at 800 (W. Va. 1966), which is almost identical to the case at the bar.
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A.
VALAD DID NOT ENTER
A GENERAL APPEARANCE
Mallory and Brown claim without merit that Valad
has done acts which constitute a general appearance, thus
subjecting it to the jurisdiction of the Court herein.

Why?

Valad allegedly filed an "Answer" and served answers to interrogatories thereafter.

The documents allegedly constituting

the "general appearance" are the single, "blue-backed" docurrents found in the record at pages 23 through 33, and the
responses to discovery found in the record at pages 63 through
107 and 115 through 122.
Objection To Jurisdiction
Raised At First Opportunity
The documents found in the record pages 23 through
33 are, significantly, Valad's first appearance of any kind

in the record.

The pleading found at page 23 is, by misnomer,

entitled "Answer, Counterclaim and Cross-Complaint".

However,

a cursory reading will reveal that it is only a one-page
response to the Cross-Complaint of Defendant Brown.
The pleading that begins at page 24 in the record
is titled

an "Answer".

It raises as the "First Defense" the

lack ot jurisdiction over the person of Valad.

(R. 25-27, 11116-18)

This defense explains at length that Valad never previously
transacted any business within the State of Utah with either
Mallory or Brown (R. 26, 11118, 9, 10) and that Valad has no
domicile, nor any office, files, facilities, equipment, sales
representatives, employees, etc., in Utah.

(R. 26 1112)

It

cannot be contested that Valad is clearly claiming, at its
earliest opportunity, that the Court lacked personal jurisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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diction over it tor anv purpose whatsoever, as to both Brown
and Mallory.

Technically, the words of objection to juris-

diction are not found in the document mistitled "Answer,
Counterclaim and Cross-Complaint"
with the "Answer".

(R.

(R. 2 3)

filed simul taneouslz

24)

No Waiver Of The Jurisdictional Defense
Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that a party waives all defenses and objections which
it does not present in its answer.

Valad raised the objection

to jurisdiction in its answer.

26)

(R.

Rule 12(b) further

provides that:
No defense or objection is waived by being joined
with one or more other defenses or objections in
a responsive pleading ... or by further pleading
after the denial of such motion or objection.
Valad's objection to jurisdiction contained in the
"Answer" was physically joined (R. 23, 24) to the mis-titled
"Answer, Counterclaim and Cross-Complaint"

(R. 2 3J, and thus

was part of the same responsive pleading.

It was obviously

intended to be joined with the defenses to Brown's Counterclaim.

Since Valad raised the issue of no personal juris-

diction in its responsive pleading designated "Answer", it
cannot be waived just because it was joined with other defenses or pleadings
No General Appearance
The distinction between general and special appearances has been narrowing.

In holding that a motion to release

the attachment did not constitute a general appearance, the
Court recently noted the following:
The distinction between general and special
appearances has been abolished by the language
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contained in Rule 12(b) as follows:
No defense or objection is waived by
being joined with one or more other
defenses or objections in a responsive
pleading or motion or by further
pleading after the denial of such motion
or objection.
Brown v. Carnes Corp, 547 P. 2d 206 at 207 (Utah 1976).
[See also Green v. Roth, 192 So. 2d 537 (Fla. App. 1966);

~

v. Sharp, 409 P. 2d 1019 (Kan. 1966); and Anderson v. Mikel
Drilling Co., 102 N.W. 2d 293 (Minn. 1960)].
Substance And Intent Prevail
Over Technicalities
The reason for the fading distinction between general and special appearances is the general policy of the
Federal Rules favoring substance over technicalities of form.
This policy has been expressed as follows:
We recognize that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure must be construed liberally to bring
about a just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action.
Any requirement of compliance
with barren technical formalities is to be avoided.
(Emphasis added)
Plant Economy, Inc. v. Mirror
Insulation Co., Inc., 308 F. 2d 375 at 378 (3rd
Cir. 1962)
Thus, where the contention is made, as in the case
at the bar, that a party has committed technical acts which
should subject him to the personal jurisdiction of the Court
despite a contrary intent, the substance of the acts should
prevail over the form.
2d 262 at 264

See Farmer's Trust v. Alexander, 6 A.

(Pa. 1939).

The intent of a party is paramount:

"An appearance is not to be inferred except as a result of

acts from which an intent to do so may properly be inferred."
6 C.J.S., Appearances, Sec. 12, P. 19.
Utah cases dealing with

the issue of "appearance"

show that this Court has been reluctant to construe a general
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appearance on a technicality.

In Fiberboard Paoer Products

Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 475 P. 2d. 1005 (1970),
the Defendant's oro se letter to Plaintiff's attorney, with
a copy to the Court Clerk, denying that he owed the bill, was
not a general appearance.
conda Co.,

Id. at 1006.

19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P. 2d 390

In Housely v. Ana(1967), the non-

resident defendant's counsel purportedly appeared "specially"
at a hearing to amend Plaintiff's complaint
objected thereto.

~nd

actually

The Supreme Court rejected Plaintiff's

claim that this constituted a general appearance because the
intent to make a special appearance by the defendant was
clearly stated.

Cf. - Barber v. calder, 522 P. 2d 700 (Utah 1974).

Other jurisdictions facing the issue of whether
a party has unintentionally done acts which amount to a
general appearance, despite contrary intent, have arrived at
similar results to that of Utah.
S.W. 2d 641 at 642

See Cornett v. Smith, 466

(Ky. 1969).

The facts of the case at the bar show that Valad
never intended to appear, nor in fact appeared

generally,

or waive it's objection to personal jurisdiction.

At the

instance of its first appearance in Court on October 29,
1973, Valad raised the objection to personal jurisdiction.
(R. 24-25)

The objection to jurisdiction was stated in clear,

concise, and unmistakable terms.

The claim that the filing

of the answer to Brown's cross-complaint

(R. 23) subjected

Valad to jurisdiction is clearly putting form and technicality
above substance, and it is not countenanced by either the
letter or the spirit of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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B.
FURTHER PLEADING OR RESPONSE
TO DISCOVERY AFTER THE OBJECTIOH
TO JURISDICTION BY VALAD DID NOT
SUBJECT IT TO THE JURISDICTION
OF THE COURT.

Valad responded to a request for admissions and
answered interrogatories in February, 1974.
75-107; 115-122)

(R. 63-74;

This could not subject Valad to the personal

jurisdiction of the Court.

All of these discovery responses

were filed pursuant to the mandatory rules requiring responses to lawful discovery requests.
U.R.C.P.

See Rules 33 and 36,

The next Court document filed by Defendant Valad

after said discovery responses was the "Special Appearance
and Notice", treated by the Court as a Motion to Quash.
(R. 135)

Because the filing of discovery responses is

mandatory, it cannot constitute a general appearance.

Rule

12(b); Semole v. Sansoucie, 104 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972); see
also Stelly v. Quick Mfg., 229 So. 2d 584 (La. 1969).

c.
A CORPORATION MAY NOT APPEAR
PRO SE, AND ANY PURPORTED
PRO SE APPEARANCE CANNOT AMOUNT
TO A GENERAL APPEARANCE.
The law is well established in this state and
elsewhere that a corporation cannot appear oro se.

Tuttle

v. Hi-land Dairymen's Assoc., 10 Utah 2d 195, 350 P. 2d
616

(1960); 19 ALR 3d 1013.

This was conceded by counsel

for Mallory and Brown when they filed a joint motion in
March of 1975, eighteen months after the case had begun, to
compel Valad to appear by counsel or suffer default.
128)

(R. 123,

All of the pleadings and Court documents in the file
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prior to this time were filed pro se by the corporation's
general manager, Peter Cecchini.

(R. 23-24, 33, the "blue-

back" ;:over sheet between 33 and 34, 73, 74, 88 and 107)
Therefore, Defendant Valad was not properly before the Court
in any event and any pleadings or documents that may have been
filed with the Court cannot amount to a general appearance
or subject Valad to the jurisdiction of the Court.
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POINT II
UNDER COMMON-LAW PRINCIPLES OF
CONTRACT LAW AND UNDER THE RULES
OF CONTRACT FORMATION PROMULGATED
BY THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
THERE WERE NO MANIFESTATION OF
MUTUAL ASSENT AND NO WRITTEN CONTRACT TO SELL BETWEEN VALAD AND BROWN
UNTIL, AFTER PROTRACTED PRELIMINARY
NEGOTIATIONS, VALAD ACCEPTED BROWN'S
COUNTER-OFFER (EXHIBIT 20). THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS REFER TO NO
FACTS CONCERNING CONTRACT FORMATION.
THEY RELY ONLY ON UNACCEPTED PURCHASE
ORDERS WHICH VALAD NEVER SIGNED IN ANY
DOCUMENT REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS; AND THEY DISREGARD EXHIBIT
20 (ALSO EXHIBIT 83).
A.
1.
Order No. 4016

On December 14, 1972, Mallory sent its Purchase
(Ex. 9) to Brown to purchase the 15 and 21 KW

heaters, which were not yet in existence and were "future
goods" under the UCC.

Under the applicable Statute of Frauds

and the UCC, a written "contract to sell" is required.
2.

On December 15th, Brown sent its P.O. 6730 to

Valad for the same two non-existent heaters (Exs. 10 and 68):
"Subject to specifications and limitations of Mallory Engineering
P.O. 4016 attached".

But it was not attached.

order concluded with the sentence:

Brown's purchase

"Engineering drawings and

certification of NBFU (National Board of Fire Underwriters)
compliance to be furnished by 12/22 so duct fabrication can
proceed."

This offer was not accepted by Valad and never became

part of any written contract to sell.

The certification was

not sent "by 12/22".
3.

On December 20, 1972, Brown by letter sent an

addendum to its P.O. 6730 to Valad (Ex. 11), on which the =eluding
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sentence was:

"We are also enclosing a copy of Mallory's pur-

chase order to us and a sketch that should have gone forward
with our original order, for your file."

Mallory's P.O. 4016

(Ex. 9) was enclosed with this letter but not the sketch.
(T. 392)

This was not an offer; it was merely part of an

offer.
4.

Exhibit 17, Valad's letter (and enclosure) dated

January 19, 1973, was sent to Nyman (Brown) and, on Nyman's
specific instructions

(T. 407), to Lee Farber (Mallory).

It

reads:
Enclosed are two (2) copies of DWG. #73119 on our vent duct heater for a total
of 21 KW, 208 VAC on your P.O. 6730.
Enclosed with this letter (Ex. 17) was Valad's shop
drawing (without annotation or postil) No. 73-119, dated "1/73"
(January 1973), which is also part of Exhibit 17.
All of the prior telephone communications and correspondence between Nyman (for Brown) and Cecchini (for Valad) had
produced a sufficient convergence of minds as to enable Valad
to develop a design and structural drawing of the still nonexistent heater inadequately attempted in Brown's P.O. 6730*
(Ex. 10) dated December 15, 1973.

The discussions between

Cecchini and Nyman had clarified, refined and modified P.O.
6730 to the point where Valad could draft and was now asking
*No purchase order presented by Mallory or Brown was ever
signed by Valad nor accepted in any document signed by it. Thus,
Plaintiff's claim that Brown's or Mallory's purchase orders constituted a contract complying with the Statute of Frauds is untenable.
Besides, these purchase orders were not specific andr··
detailed enough to enable anyone to manufacture the theoreuca.,.
proposed, but non-existent, heaters.

-16-
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approval of its drawing No. 73-119, which incorporated these
clarifications, refinements and modifications.

Neither this

drawing, nor the letter transmitting them, say anything about
performance-standards.*

But 1hey did constitute Va lad's first

firm of fer to Brown which the latter could accept or refuse
to accept.

As appears below, Brown did not accept this

firm offer by Valad.
5.
Brown changed,

Exhibit 11, dated December 20, 1972, shows that
and to that extent abandoned, its P.O. 6730

dated December 15, 1972 (Ex. 10), to which Valad's transmittal
letter in Exhibit 17 had referred.

That was tantamount to

an anticipatory rejection of Valad's firm offer (Ex. 17) based
on the supplemented P.O. 6730.
During the period between the dispatch, on December
15, 1972, of Brown's P.O. 6730 to Valad and December 23, 1972,
when Valad received Exhibit 11 (dated December 20, 1972), there
were many further phone calls and other communications between
Nyman and Cecchini which further clarified, refined and modified Exhibit 10, Brown's P.O. 6730:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)
(6)
(7)

12/15/72: A telephone call (T. 395)
12/19/72: A Valad letter to Nyman
(Ex. 70; T. 391)
12/19/72: Telephone call (T. 395)
12/20/72: Brown's P.O. 6730 was
amended by its letter of that date
to Valad which added to that purchase
order (Ex. 11)
12/20/72: Telephone call (T. 258,
393-4, 397)
12/21/72: Valad's letter to Brown
( T. 3 9 5; Ex. 72)
12/21/72: Valad's "Price Quotation"
with sketch (Ex. 54)

*As Exhibits 17 (and Exhibits 20 and 83) show.
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( 8)
( 9)

(10)

12/21/72: Phone call (T. 393-4)
12/22/72: Valad's letter to Nyman
regarding thermostats, etc.
(T. 396-7;
Ex. 47)
12/22/72: Valad's letter (T. 119-20)

All of the foregoing negotiations would have been
unnecessary had Valad actually accepted Brown's P.O. 6730
(Ex. 10) or had Brown considered its P.O. 6730 final and
satisfactory.
6.

Exhibit 18, Valad's transmittal letter dated

January 22, 1973, changed the picture by revising its shop
drawing #73-119 and by submitting another shop drawing nurnbered 73-120.

It read:

Enclosed are two (2) copies of DWG. #73-120
on our Vent Duct Heater, 5 KW ea. 208V, 1 PH
on P.O. #6730.
[A]lso enclosed are two (2)
revised copies of DWG. #73-119, 7 KW eac.
208V, P.O. #6730. Two hole location was left
off.
This was obviously a new firm offei: (or counteroffer with respect to P.O. 6730) proposed by Valad for Brown's
acceptance.

Up to this point in time,

the numerous discussions

and negotiations had produced absolutely no contract to sell
and no meeting of minds.

It had produced only conversations

searching for specifics on which to agree.

The new firm offer

(or counter-offer vis-a-vis Brown's P.O. 6730) by Valad replacec
and revised Valad's transmittal letter dated January 19, 1973
and its enclosed shop drawing, both of which constituted
Exhibit 17.
B.
Exhibits 20 and 83*, dated January 26, 1973, are
Nyman' s speedletter and enclosures

(drawings 73-119 and 73-1201

*Exhibit 8 3 is the original speedletter and its enclosures
(drawings annotated by Nyman); Exhibit 20 is a copy of Exhibit
83. Where, in this brief, one of these two is mentioned, the
other is intended, also.
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which are Brown's response to Valad's new firm offer, described
in Section 6, supra.

By Exhibit 18, Valad had sent to Brown

two pairs of each of two different shop drawings without handwritten annotations or postils.

Now, by Exhibit 83 (also Ex. 20)

Brown returned to Valad one of each of the two different pairs
of shop drawings; i.e. Valad's revised shop drawing #73-119 and
Valad's shop drawing #73-120.

But the returned drawings were

now annotated by comments on the face of each drawing in Nyman's
handwriting and by his instructions in his speedletter.
20 and 83)

(Exs.

These annotations show that Brown had substantially

accepted Valad's new firm offer (its counter-offer vis-a-vis
Brown's P.O. 6730).

To be more precise, the annotations showed

that Brown would accept Valad's said new firm offer provided
certain changes, as detailed in Nyman's annotations and speedletter, were made.

In other words, as each of the two returned

drawings showed (by postils in Nyman's handwriting above Nyman's
signature) the Valad new firm offer (Ex. 18) was "Approved for
construction, subject to comments as made" on the drawings and
in the speedletter.

(Exs. 20 and 83; T. 411-12, 429-30, 451-53)

valad promptly agreed to these changes by telephone;
then valad proceeded immediately to manufacture the heaters
as shown on the drawings, which Nyman had "approved for construction".

(Ex. 20)

In so manufacturing the heaters, Valad

followed exactly the comments and annotations made by Nyman in
Exhibit 20, which is the only manifestation of mutual assent
in this case; the only written contract in this case which satsifies the Statute of Frauds.

(Exs. 20 and 83)

c.
The following legal principles are applicable to this
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written contract as set forth above:
1.

Communications which constitute mere negotia-

tions preparatory to an agreement do not imply a contract.
Head v. Providence Ins. Co., 2 Crunch 127, 2 L.Ed. 129; South
Boston Iron Co. v. United States, 118 U.S. 37.
2.

There can be no contract in compliance with

constitutional due process where the minds of the parties have
not met.

Utley v. Donaldson, 94 U.S. 29; Holder v. Anltman,

M. & Co., 169 U.S. 81; Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61,
362 P. 2d 427 (1961); Oberhansley v. Earle, 572 P. 2d 1384
(Utah 1977).
3.

What one party to a contract understands or

believes (see e.g. T. 101-4, 106-11, 113-16) does not govern
construction thereof unless such understanding or belief is
induced by conduct of the other party.

National Bank of

Metropolis v. Kennedy, 17 Wall 19; 21 L.Ed. 554.
4.

The Courts may not, constitutionally, make for

the parties a better agreement than they themselves have been
satisfied to make.

Green County v. Qunlan, 211 U.S. 582;

New Orleans v. New Orleans Waterworks Co., 142 U.S. 79; Imperiai
Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 U.S. 452.
5.

In contract law, the specific (e.g. structural

drawings like Exhibit 83) prevail over the general or merely
theoretical (like Brown's and Mallory's purchase orders not
capable of manufacture).
6.

Smoot v. United States, 237 U.S. 38.

Where as here, both parties treated a document

(Exhibits 20 and 83) as the agreement and acted upon it, an agre>
ment is legally implied.

Small Co. v. American Sugar Refini~

Co., 267 U.S. 233.
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D.
The American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law
of Contracts makes "manifestation of assent by the parties who form
the contract to the terms thereof" a "requirement of the law
for the formation of an informal contract".

(Ch. 3 § 19)

In

this connection the Restatement classifies contracts as "formal
or informal"

(Ch. 1, §6) and defines "informal contracts" as

all contracts other than "contracts under seal," "recognizances"
and "negotiable instruments."

(Ch. 1 §§6, 7 and 11)

On the subject of "Offer and Acceptance", the Restatement states:
The manifestation of mutual assent almost
invariably takes the form of an offer or
proposal by one party accepted by the other
party or parties.
(Ch. 3, §22)
Its

"Comment" on § 22 is, in part:

This rule is rather one of necessity than
of law.
In the nature of the case one
party must ordinarily first announce what he
will before there can be any manifestation
of mutual assent ...
Exhibit 20 as a counter-offer was so definite in
its terms that Valad was able immediately to manufacture it.
(Restatement, Ch. 3, § 32)
P.O. 4016

This was not true of Mallory's

(Ex. 9) nor of Brown's P.O. 6730 (Ex. 10) as aug-

mented by Brown's letter of December 20, 1972.

(Ex. 11)

Even if Valad had not notified Brown of its acceptance of the Brown counter-offer (Ex. 20), Valad did what
that counter-offer requested; i.e., it produced heaters
required by Exhibit 20, designed and constructed in every
detail as that Exhibit required.

Thus, Valad's performance,

without more, operates as a promise to render complete performance.

(Restatement, Ch. 3 § 63)
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E.
Under the U.C.C., "goods which are not both existing
and identified are 'future' goods"; and a "purported present
sale of future goods or any interest therein operates as a
contract to sell".

70A-2-105(1) and (2)

The contract formed

by Valad's acceptance of Brown's counter-offer (Ex. 20) was
a "contract to sell" within the meaning of UCC 70A-2-105(2).
The only contract in this case was the contract to
sell made by Valad's acceptance of Brown's counter-offer
(Ex. 20) .
time.

The goods contracted for were non-existent at the

They were "future goods" which as such could be specifiec

for accurate contractual identification only by a structural
drawing like Exhibit 20.

The heaters produced by Valad con-

formed with that contract because they were "in accordance with
the obligations under the contract" (Exhibit 20) within the
meaning of 70A-2-106(2}.

That contract did not violate the

Statute of Frauds, since it was in writing.

(Ex. 20)

If proffered as a contract, the purchase orders,
being unsigned by Valad (and unaccepted by it in any other
signed documents) would violate the Statute of Frauds.

Neither

the Trial Court nor the Plaintiff bothered to consider this.
Under the UCC, a contract to sell may be made "in
any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by
both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.'
Brown and Mallory did recognize the existence of the Exhibit
20

(83) .

And an "agreement sufficient to constitute a coni

tract of sale may be found even though the moment of its makinc I
is undetermined".

70A-2-201 (2)

No language spelling out a performance warranty or
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performance standards
20) accepted by Valad.

was part of the counter-offer (Ex.
The statutory warranty of title and

against infringement was not violated by Valad.

70A-2-312(1)

and (3), and 70A-2-313
In the instant case there was no implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose under 70A-2-315, because
neither Brown nor Valad knew or understood, when their contract
was formed, the particular purpose for which the heaters were
required, nor the environment in which they would be placed.
(T. 6-7, 430-432, 424-427, 481, 493)
government contracts.

Valad never saw the

Therefore, the buyer Brown could not

rely on Valad's skill or judgment to select suitable heaters
within the meaning of 70A-2-315.

Brown was buying from Valad

for the purpose of reselling to Mallory; and the written contract to sell (Ex. 20) was basically a specific, structural
drawing which required Valad to

build the heaters pursuant

to the design delineated in those drawings.
Brown, before entering into the contract to sell,
could not examine the goods (which were not yet made) nor
a sample thereof (there was none) nor a model thereof (it
existed only virtually in the drawings which the buyer approved).

Therefore, a warranty of performance must be ex-

eluded, since a drawing can't be tested for performance and
no prototype was made by Valad or ordered from or tested by
Valad or anyone else.

See 70A-2-316.

The heaters covered

by the written agreement (Ex. 20) were in Class B, not Class
i
'I
'I

C, of the manufacturer's products.

(T. 425-430, 437, 452,

475, 481-2, 492-3, 495-6, 524-530)
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F.
Nowhere in the Findings of Fact is there any statement which indicates when or whether a legal contract between
Valad and Brown eventuated or what the terms of that contract
were.

Finding Nos. 4 through 9 were written on the assumption

that Brown's P.O. 6730 (dated December 15, 1972) as amended
by Brown's letter dated December 20, 1972

(Ex. 11) constituted

a contract without the least respect for the Statute of Frauds.
That assumption is factually and legally erroneous.

No evi-

dence suggests that Valad ever accepted Brown's P.O. 6730 or
its addendum dated December 20, 1972.

Each was incomplete

without the other, even from Brown's point of view (as Exhibit
11 shows).

Both were superseded eventually by

Exhibit 20.

The assumption that Valad accepted Exhibits 10 and 11 does
not explain the negotiations about the structure of the 15
and 21 KW heaters which continued, unabated, from December
15, 1972 to January 26, 1973, when Brown sent its speedletter
enclosing Valad's annotated drawings (Ex. 20).

Nor does that

assumption explain Exhibit 20, reference to which the Trial
Judge carefully but inexplicably eliminated from his Findings
of Fact.
These Findings generally omit any indication of
contract formation or the precise terms and conditions of the
contract on which the Trial Court relied to find a breach by
Valad.

The most important document in case, Exhibit 20, was

completely neglected by the Trial Court.

Apart from that

document and its acceptance by Valad, there is absolutely no
evidence in the record of mutual assent, contract or meeting
of minds.

The Findings never show what offer Valad accepted
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from Brown prior to January 26, 1973, to form a plausible and
legal contract to sell.

If Exhibit 20 (83) is not the con-

tract to sell, there was none.

Thus, the Findings unveil no

contract on which the Trial Court could lawfully rely.
The Findings indicate an attempt to convert unaccepted offers (e.g. Exhibits 9 and 10) which were naked purchase orders for non-existent goods (i.e., "future goods"
under the UCC) into a contract binding Valad.
Finding No. 2 goes beyond the Trial Court's ruling
when it accepted the Government contracts in evidence.

They

were admitted only "to show . . . there was a contract for
the production of environmental units".

(T. 6-10)

Finding No.

2 erroneously includes Mallory's "commitments to manufacture
. • environmental units which required as part of their essential components some electrical heaters of precise and
exacting specifications."

(Emphasis added)

The contents of

the Government contracts were not part of the admitted evidence.

Finding No. 2 erroneously makes them a part.
Finding No. 10 fails to give the valid reasons,

appearing in the record, why the 36 and 50 KW heaters were
not shipped.

(T. 429-430)

Finding No. 15 disregards the overwhelming evidence
demonstrating that (a) Brown and Mallory accepted delivery of
the 15 and 21 KW heaters*;

(b) the delivery dates were not

hard and fast conditions*;

(c) the delivery dates were waived

or modified*; and (d) the delivery dates were not of the
essence in the contract to sell (Exhibit 20)*.
*These matters are discussed in Points III and IV of
this brief.
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Finding Nos. 16 and 17 are irrelevant insofar as
they refer to the 12 KW heater, about which there was no dispute.

Valad admitted having made the 12 KW heaters incorrect1 1

because of a typographical error which read 1.2 KW instead of
12 KW.

(T. 455-459)

Indeed, Valad had, by its Interrogatory

No. 2, asked Mallory, for the purpose of delimiting the items
of damage, to detail all of the violations of contract it
was claiming.

(R. 294, T. 67)

That had the effect of con-

fining those claimed violations to (i) sheath temperature,
(ii) continous flow of voltage,
heaters and (iv) delivery time.

(iii) KW capacity of the
All these matters concerned

only the 15 and 21 KW heaters.
Finding No. 17 merely alleges generally and unspecifically "defective" heater assemblies.
fects" are not pointed out.

The alleged "de-

It is impossible to determine

what precisely the Court had in mind.
Finding No. 18 omits the substantial, unrefuted and
irrefutable evidence of the unreliability of Mallory's tests.
They were performed with improperly calibrated instruments
based on no certificate of calibration

(T. 49, 56, 58-60,

63, 505-506); with make-shift graph paper not intended for
the testing instrument used (T. 57-58); with some thermostats '
bypassed (T. 51, 60); with other thermostats ruined by the
heat caused by welding.

(~

175, 506-510, 516-518)

Mallory's

story of 500°F. heat is incredible (T. 509-510, 513-514),
because it means that not one of the 18 thermostats, installed \
by Valad in the heaters, functioned to cut off the current

'

at 250°F., at which all the thermostats were (without contradietary evidence) set.

(T. 509, 513)

function of sheath surface area.

The KW capacity is a

(T. 383-384, 154-155)
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The

I

Valad drawings (Ex. 20) annotated by Nyman showed that sheath
area, the formula for which Nyman knew (T. 373-374, 378-379,
383-384) when he approved the drawings in Exhibit 20 (83).
Finding No. 22 is both incomplete and erroneous.
The sheath temperature could not possibly have been above
250°F., if Mallory had not damaged or bypassed the 18 reliable
Rance thermostats with which Valad had equipped the heaters.
It is physically impossible for all 18 thermostats to have
failed when 225°F. was reached.

Nor were these heaters

de~

fective or in violation of the contract to sell or of the
"Certificates of Certification."
Finding No. 23 alleges unspecifically that Valad did
not meet the "required specifications" -- which ones the Court
leaves to speculation.

Valad complied with the approved

structural drawings in Exhibit 20 (83).

(T. 429-430)

Finding No. 24 assumes that Valad had a contractual
duty to supply replacement heaters gratis.

No such duty can

be discovered in the contract to sell·

20)

(Ex.

The Findings

pay no attention to the relevant fact that the Regan heaters
(which were ordered by Mallory purchase orders) specified
watt density.
not do so.

The Brown

and Mallory

purchase orders did

(Exs. 9, 10, and 11; T. 91, 170-172, 526; Exs. 39-41)
G.

Conclusions of Law Nos. 3 and 4 state:

"Valad

breached its contracts ... ", as if there were more than one
contract!

Nowhere in the Findings or Conclusions did the

Trial Court:

Identify these contracts; describe how they

were formed; state who made the offers and who the acceptances;
affirm whether they were contracts of sale or contracts to
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sell; recite their terms; aver that they were written or oral;
cite or exhibit a specific writing competent to serve as the
basic written contract; or, if oral, explain away the applicable Statute of Frauds.

The conclusion that "Valad breached

its contracts" thus has no factual or legal premise.
The evidence establishes that Valad built the 15
and 21 KW heaters in meticulous compliance with the structural
drawings (Ex. 20 or 83) approved by Brown.

There was, there-

fore, no breach of any contract by Valad.
Assuming breach, arguendo, the conclusion of ind:irect
damages of $30,840.60 is legal error, as shown in Point VII
infra.
Conclusion of Law No. 5 states:

"Mallory is en-

titled to judgment against Valad for ... damages to Mallory
sustained being a Third Party Beneficiary of the contract of
sale ... "

This conclusion is legal error on two scores:

There was no contract of sale; there was only a contract to
sell, in view of the UCC.

In the second place, Mallory was

not, as a matter of law, a "third party beneficiary."
H.
Mallory's complaint purports to allege three causes
of action against Brown and Valad.

The first cause of action

does not mention, refer to or intimate any contract between
Brown and Valad.
against Valad.

Nor does it state any cause of action
Its sole reference to Valad (R. 2 •3l merely

states that Valad "is a New York Corporation with its princi·
pal place of business in Tarrytown, Westchester County, New
York."
The second cause of action also fails to allege or
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mention any contract between Brown and Valad.

It refers,

however, to Valad's "Certificates of Certification"

(Exs. 22

and 23) dated March 13, 1973 which were sent to Mallory
(and Brown) long after the contract to sell between Brown
and Valad (Ex. 20) dated January 26, 1973, had been coneluded.

These "certificates" are discussed below.
The third cause of action also fails to allege or

mention any contract between Brown and Valad.

The record

and Mallory's responses to interrogatories show there never
was any contract relationship between Valad and Mallory
respecting the 15 and 21 KW heaters, and no theory of "third
party beneficiary" appears anywhere in the complaint.
I.

The documentary supplements to the complaint, such
as Mallory's "Response" to Valad's request for production of
documents show the bankruptcy of Mallory's claims.

In the

answer to Valad's demand No. 1 that Mallory produce "copy of
any and all papers comprising a contract between Defendant
Brown and Plaintiff [Mallory]", the latter answered on October 28, 1975:
The papers comprising the contract between
Defendant Brown and Plaintiff consist of
the following, copies of which are attached:
(a) Mallory P.O. 4016; (b) Mallory P.O.
4047; and (c) Mallory P.O. 4041.
(R. 211)
But they were neither signed nor accepted by Valad.

Plaintiff

never even alleged that they were.
Valad's Request No. 2 required Mallory to produce
"each and every paper, if there be more than one, which sets
forth any contract which Mallory alleges existed between
Mallory and Valad."

(R. 211)

Mallory answered:
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There was never a direct contract between
Mallory and Valad, except for the guarantee
and certification expressly requested from
Valad by Mallory and these written guarantees and certifications are dated March 13,
1973 and pertain to the 15 and 21 KW heaters,
=pies of which are attached hereto.
(R. 212)
Mallory contends that its unaccepted purchase orders
in some way constitute a contract between Brown and Valad!
Clearly, however, the purchase orders were not accepted and
did not constitute a contract with Valad.
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POINT III
TIME WAS NOT OF THE ESSENCE
IN EITHER MALLORY'S CONTRACT
WITH BROWN OR BROWN'S WITH
VALAD; THERE WAS NO FIRM OR
FIXED DATE OF DELIVERY; AND
THERE WAS NO BREACH OF CONTRACT
BY VALAD BECAUSE OF LATE DELIVERY. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS
AND CONCLUSIONS ON DELIVERY HAVE
NO FACTUAL OR LEGAL FOUNDATION;
AND MALLORY IS EQUITABLY ESTOPPED
FROM PRESSING ITS FALSE CONTENTION OF LEGALLY LATE DELIVERY.
The Court found in part that Valad breached its
contract with Brown, and was thus liable to Mallory under
the third party beneficiary theory (Conclusions of Law No.
5), because the heaters were late (Finding of Fact No. 15),
and because Valad did not take corrective action.
of Fact Nos. 23 and 24)

(Finding

Mallory received the 12, 15 and

21 KW heaters (T. 36-37), found satisfactory and used the
12 KW heater (T. 189-190), and eventually alleged the 15 and
21 KW heaters to be unsatisfactory.

(T. 39)

The 36 and 50

KW heaters were never shipped due to Mallory's repudiation
(see Point IV).

The Trial Court apparently believed the

questionable testimony of Mallory's President, Lee Farber,
that "time was of the essence" on all of the orders for all
the heaters.

The Plaintiff then calculated the alleged

indirect damages, based upon the "delay" figured from six
weeks after the dates of Mallory's purchase orders.

(Exs.

100 and 102, and Ex. A of the Findings)
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law seriously
misapply the law to the facts, have no substantial support in
the evidence, and constitute reversible error.

R. C. Tolman

Co., Inc., v. Mighton Water Assoc., 563 P. 2d 780 (Utah

1977);
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Brown v. Board of Education in Morgan County School District,
560 P. 2d 1129 (Utah 1977).
Delivery Times of Heaters
Finding of Fact No. 15 reflects the following time
schedule alleged by Plaintiff on the basis of offers (purchase
orders) which Valad did not accept with respect to various
heaters:
ITEM

INITIAL UNACCEPTED OFFER*

SENT
FROM/TO

ALLEGED
DELIVERY TH'i.E

15 and 21
KW Heaters
(Job 281)

P.O. 4016
12/14/72
(Ex. 9)

Mallory
to
Brown

"delivery guaranteed
within
6 weeks ARO"

21 KW
Heater
(Job 281)

P.O. 6730
12/15/72
(Ex. 10)

Brown
to
Val ad

"when ship-1/24/73,
or before"

15 KW
Heater
(Job 281)

Letter
12/20/72
(Ex. 11)

Brown
to
Val ad

NO DATE ALLEGED

12 and 50
KW Heaters
(Job 277)

P.O. 4047
12/26/72
(Ex. 12)

Mallory
to
Brown

NO DATE ALLEGED

12 and 50
KW Heaters
(Job 277)

P.O. 6754
1/03/73
(Ex. 13)

Brown
to
Val ad

"when ship--ASAP"

36 KW
Heater
(Job 285)

P.O. 4241
2/08/73
(Ex. 14)

Mallory
to
Brown

NO DATE ALLEGED

36 KW
Heater
(Job 285)

P.O. 7269
2/07/73
(Ex. 15)

Brown
to
Va lad

"when ship--ASAP-6 weeks or before"

* None of these offers were ever accepted.

See Point II
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The Applicable Statutes
The Uniform Commercial Code provides that the time
for shipment or delivery where not provided or agreed upon is
a "reasonable time".

701<-2-309 (1)

What constitutes a.

reasonable time "depends on the nature, purpose and circumstances of such action".
m~y

be waived.

70A-l-204(2)

70A-2-209(4)

A time requirement

It may be modified by the par-

ties (70A-2-209) or repudiated by the buyer, giving the
aggrieved party the right to suspend performance.

70A-2-610

Unsupported Computation of Delayed Time
Finding No. 25 and Exhibit A to the Findings allegedly reflect the "total delayed time" in days for each heater.
On P.O. 4016, the time was computed from January 25, 1973,
the claimed "delivery date", through June 8, 1973, when the
"cover" heaters ordered from another manufacturer were
installed, a total of 133 days.
Damages", Ex. 100 and 102)

(Plaintiff's "Itemization of

Similarly, Mallory calculated

"indirect damages" for 112 days on P.O. 4047 and 70 days on
P.O. 4241.

Id.
No Delivery Date Specified
Mallory's P.O. 4047 and 4241 are undated as to

delivery time.

The finding of the Court that these heaters

were late is unsupported by the record and evidence.
The Court accepted Mallory's ipse dixit testimony
about delivery time six weeks from the dates of Mallory's
purchase orders.
the evidence.

(P.O. 4047 and 4241)

This was contrary to

For example, Interrogatory No. 9, Valad's

First Set of Interrogatories to Mallory (R. 185) , asked
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Mallory to "specify the commitment or commitments which
Plaintiff claims Valad violated".

Farber's answer, based

on the false claim that Valad had accepted the purchase
orders, was as follows:
Mallory P.O. 4016 stipulates a guaranteed
delivery date "within 6 weeks ARO". Specific
delivery dates were not specified on Mallory
P.O. 4047 and 4241, but it was a general
understanding with the Ted R. Brown C'o. that
Valad had intended to provide heaters in
sufficient time to permit orderly contract
completion without contract modification for
consideration.
(emphasis added)
(R. 297)
When Mallory's Farber was pressed for an explanation
as to what constituted the "general understanding" at trial
(T. 193-4), he admitted the following:
A.

Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Brown's P.O. 6754 is not so explicit in
that it just says "ASAP".
But Brown
understood, which is the reason for my
saying "generally understood", that time
was of the essence on all of these projects.
Why do you say Brown understood it since
you are speaking of the understanding of
someone else? Is there something they
said to you that indicated that?
When I say Brown understood, I meant specifically Mr. Nyman understood that time was of
the essence.
But my question is why do you say he understood it? How do you know he understood it?
I assume he understood it.
(emphasis added)
(T. 194)

The Court based its damage award on Farber's unrevealed
assumption, of which Valad knew nothing.

This is manifest

error.
Waiver or Estoppel as to Time of Delivery Requirements
The facts mandate a finding of waiver of delivery
time requirements on all of the jobs.

The law on waiver in

commercial situations has been stated as follows:
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It is sometimes indicated that where a buyer
does not treat the contract as breached after
delivery had been delayed beyond the time stipulated, but evidences an intent to continue the
contract in force, the buyer is deemed to waive
the time limit for delivery and to permit delivery within a reasonable time thereafter ... the
act of a buyer accepting the goods after a
delay in delivery, with full knowledge thereof,
has also been held to bar the buyer from refusing
to pay or taking action to rescind or cancel the
contract ...
67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales, §330, pps. 469-70.
(emphasis
added)
Since no particular provision of the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code displaces the common law of waiver or estoppel, it is applicable in this case.

U.C.A. 1953 §70A-l-103

See also Clovis National Bank v. Thomas, 425 P. 2d 726

(N.M.

196 7) .
The following points, completely ignored by the
Court in its findings, show waiver and demonstrate the gross
misapplication of the law to the facts:
1.

MALLORY APPROVED THE CONSTRUCTION PLANS FOR THE

15 AND 21 KW HEATERS ON OR ABOUT THE PURPORTED "TIME OF THE
ESSENCE" DELIVERY DATE OF JANUARY 24, 1973.

On the 15 and 21

KW heaters, Mallory figured damages from January 24, 1973
(Ex. 102, pg. 6), because the unaccepted P.O. 4016 dated
December 14, 1972 (Ex. 9) purportedly allowed six weeks for
delivery.

Valad's customer, Ted R. Brawn and Associates,

received P.O. 4016 from Mallory, sent its own purchase orders
to Valad, received Valad's construction drawings, and returned
to Valad a Jan. 26, 1973 dated "speed letter" with the approved
construction drawings.
275 and 411)

(Exs. 20, 55, and 83; T. 35, 221-22,

In other words, this speed letter was not even

mailed to Valad until at least two days after (!) Mallory's
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alleged "time of the essence" delivery date, January 24th.
(Ex . 10 2 , p • 6 )
Knowledge of Delay at Time of Approval
The strongest evidence of Mallory's waiver of any
specific delivery time on the heaters represented by P.O.
4016 is the undisputed fact tlat only a few days before the
Jan. 26, 1973 "speed letter" to Valad (Exs. 20 and 83),
Mallory approved the shop drawings.

Exhibit 20 itself

recites that "The drawings 73-119 and 73-120 ... have been
reviewed by Mallory Engineering and approved ... "

Since the

drawings referred to were only sent to Mallory by Valad on
January 19th (Dwg. 73-119 - 21 KW, Ex. 17) and January 22nd
(Dwg. 73-120 - 15 KW, Ex. 18), this "review" and "approval"
--especially with mailing time--must have occured around
January 24th through January 25th.

(T. 180-1)

Thus, Mallory

had to know at the time of said approval that construction
could not even begin until after the alleged "time of the
essence" deli very date.

Yet Mallory still, curiously, claims

damages on the 15 and 21 KW heaters from January 24th.

Valad

was lulled into proceeding with manufacture and Mallory should
be estopped to claim late delivery.
2.

MALLORY'S ALLEGED DAMAGES DON'T COINCIDE WITH

THE ALLEGED DELAYS.

With respect to the damages due to alleged

"lateness" of delivery, Farber testified:
The heaters started to cause me troubles when
they were not delivered after January 29, 1973,*
which was the guaranteed delivery date that I
would get the heaters ... And for the period of
February, March and April this heater problem
*This is probably reporter error since Farber consistent!:
testified that January "24", 1973, was the guaranteed delive0
date.
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I

80ntributed significantly to the inability of
Mallory Engineering to meet its obligations.
(T. 740)
It is terribly inconsistent for Mallory to claim damages
during February, March and April, when by Farber's own
testimony, Mallory's approval of Valad's shop drawings could
not have reached Valad until January 28 or 29, 1973.

Also,

Mallory did not even issue P.O. 4241 (36 KW heaters, no
delivery date specified) until February 8, 1973.

Thus,

Mallory's damage claims simply find no support in the evidence.
3.

MALLORY DID NOT PROTEST "DELAYS".

Mallory's

lack of protest or objection was a tacit, or implicit waiver
of any requirement of delivery by January 24, 1973, giving
rise to equitable estoppel.

In fact, in his testimony about

the receipt and delivery of the 15 and 21 KW heaters (P.O.
4016), Farber stated:
I don't recall specifically whether it's a
15 or 21 KW heater, was delivered in early
March of 1973. The second two sets of that
heater as I recall were delivered March 19,
1973.
(emphasis added)
(T. 713) ~~
It's my recollection that we received Valad
heaters in two separate shipments - two or
three shipments.
I'm not exactly--two I'm
positive of, in March of 1973.
(emphasis
added)
(T. 36) - There is absolutely no testimony or showing of protest based
on late delivery until late April when Farber finally telephoned Valad.
4.

(T. 241, 75, 415)
MALLORY'S REQUEST FOR THE CERTIFICATES OF CERT-

IFICATION SHOWS ACCEPTANCE OF THE PURPORTED LACK OF TIMELINESS.
Mallory's waiver of late delivery is implicit in its request
for the "certificates of certification"

(Exs. 22 and 23),

accepted without protest in the middle of March, 1973.
105,ln. 29)

(T.

The certificates were dated March 13, 1973.
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(T. 38, 105, 134, 135)

All of the heaters were received

by mid-March on Farber's own calculations (T. 36, 38, 713;
Exs. 100, 102), yet the record shows no protest, objection,
demand or claim of delay until early May.

This is a clear

waiver of firm delivery dates, and Mallory should be estopped
from claiming that time was of the essence!
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POINT IV
MALLORY ACCEPTED THE HEATERS
WITHOUT ANY VALID REJECTION.
MALLORY ALSO UNLAWFULLY REPUDIATED THE CONTRACT BETWEEN BROWN
AND VALAD. BROWN PARTICIPATED
IN THAT ILLEGAL REPUDIATION.
MOREOVER, MALLORY, IN CONCERT
WITH BROWN, UNLAWFULLY REJECTED
THE 15 KW AND 21 KW HEATERS,
WHICH CONFORMED EXACTLY WITH
BROWN'S SPECIFICATIONS, AS SHOWN
IN POINTS II, V AND VI HEREIN.
The Utah Uniform Commercial Code

provides that

acceptance occurs if any of three conditions arises, when
the buyer:
(a)

after a reasonable opportunity to inspect
the goods signifies to the seller that the
goods are conforming or that he will retain
them in spite of their non~conformity; or
(bl fails to make an effective rejection ... ; or
(cl does any act inconsistent with the seller's
ownership •.. ; U.C.A. 1953 §70A-2-606.
In the event that the goods are deemed non-conforming,
the buyer (Mallory) must "reject" the goods under the Code,
as provided in §70A-2-602.

Rejection must be within a

reasonable time after delivery and it is ineffective unless
the buyer (Brown)
70A-2-602(1)

"seasonably" notified the seller (Val ad) .

Furthermore, any exercise of ownership by

the buyer with respect to the goods after rejection is wrongful.

If the buyer takes possession of the goods before

rejection, he is under a duty after rejection to use reasonable
care in storing or handling them.

70A-2-602(2) (a) and (bl

In addition, the buyer must specify in connection with the
rejection a particular defect ascertainable by reasonable
inspection to later justify the rejection where the seller
(Valad)

could have cured said defect if the buyer (Mallory)

had stated it seasonably.

70A-2-605
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The cited law was either ignored or seriously misapplied by the Court, thus constituting reversible error.
Mallory's Acceptance
The Valad packing slips show that the 15 and 21 KW
heaters were shipped in March (Exs. 36 and 37), and Farber
testified that they were installed in late March and April of
1973.

(T.

37-8)

Because the heaters were received both in

early March (T. 713) and late March (T. 36), Mallory must
have been in possession of the heaters for two to three weeks
before they were finally installed.

(T.

37-8)

The waiting

period plus the eventual installation certainly constitute
acceptance under 70A-2-605 and 606, since Mallory had "reasonable opportunity to

inspect the goods."

No Revocation Of Acceptance
There was no revocation of acceptance after discovery of any "alleged" defect under 70A-2-608 (1) (b).

The

test performed by Mallory after the units were installed
(T.

39, ls. 14-26, T. 126), could have easily been performed

prior to the installation.

(T. 217-18; 505-511, 513)

In

fact, the Stabro lab tests conducted immediately prior to
the trial and more than two-and-a-half years after the
tests done by Mallory, showed how quickly the test could be
made and also exhibit results similar to the Mallory tests,
{T. 86-7, 593, Ex.

38)

ably, assuming arguendo

Thus, if Mallory

had acted reason-

that the heaters were non-conforming,

the nonconformity could have been discovered prior to installation.

{T. 39-40, 86-88)

Thus, there could be no

revocation of acceptance under law.
Furthermore, under 70A-2-608(2), Mallory could not
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revoke its acceptance after the discovery in late April, 1975,
of the alleged non-conformity, because the revocation must
"occur within a reasonable time after the buyer ... should have
discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change
in condition of the goods ... "

(Emphasis added)

Mallory

should have discovered the alleged defect in late March or
early April when the heaters were received.

For reasons known

only to itself, it did not discover the alleged defects until
the latter part of April.

(T. 241, 75, 414)

By installing the heaters prior to the tests, Mallory
also caused a "substantial changa in the condition of the goods"
since they could not be removed without destruction.
71); 70A-2-608(2)

(T.

69-

Later, the heaters were in fact destroyed

in removal, a fact known in advance of installation by Mallory.

(T. 69-71)

Thus, their installation in the first

instance was an act inconsistent with the seller's ownership,
foreclosing revocation under still another code section.
70A-2-606(1) (c)

Thus, there was no valid revocation of ac-

ceptance by Mallory.
No Effective Rejection By Mallory
70A-2-606(1) (bl provides that the buyer has accepted goods unless he makes effective rejection pursuant
to 70A-2-602(1).

Mallory made an ineffectual attempt at

rejection, after various conversations in early May, culminating in the Mailgram of rejection (as well as repudiation)
addressed to Valad on May 8, 1973.

(T. 81-2, Ex. 35)

Even

if Mallory's oral rejection came a day or two before the written rejection, as mentioned in the Mailgram (Ex. 35), it
still occured almost two months after the first shipment of
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heaters, and forty days after the second shipment.
occured long after installation.

It also

However, 70A-2-602(1)

re-

quires the following:
Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable
time after their delivery or tender.· It is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies-the seller.
(Emphasis added)
Forty days to two months after delivery is certainly not
reasonable time for rejection.

This is especially so for

alleged defects that could have been discovered upon testing
on arrival

(and before installation).

(T. 39-40, 86-88)

Mallory Repudiated The Contract,
Thus Substantially Impairing The Value
Of Said Contract To Valad, Resulting In
Valad's Suspension Of Performance.
The Uniform Commercial Code provides in 70A-2-610
as follows:
Anticipatory repudiation--when either party
repudiates the contract with respect to a
performance not yet due, the loss of which
will substantially impair the value of the
contract to the other, the aggrieved party
may ... (cl suspend his own performance.
A± the time of repudiation (T.

81-2, Ex. 35), on May 8, 1973,

Mallory had no idea whether the unshipped, unmanufactured
36 and 50 KW heaters would be conforming, or for that matter,
could be made or altered to conform to Mallory's subjective
desires.

Thus, Mallory's repudiation was totally unjustified.
Mallory's repudiation substantially impaired the

value of the contract to Valad since Mallory made a clear
statement with Ex.

35 that it did not interrl to continue the

contract and would secure what, in its opinion, were conforminc
heaters elsewhere.

This statement by Mallory gave rise to

Valad's rightful suspension of its performance on P.O.'s 4047
and
4241.
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I
!

Even Assuming That Vcilad's Performance Was
Late With Respect tc Deliv2ry, Such Is Excused.
'rhe Uniform Connnercial Code provides that:
Delay in delivery or non-delivery ... is not a
breach of his (seller's) duty ... if performance
as agreed has been made impracticable by the
occurence of a contingency, the non-occurence
of which was a basic assumption upon which the
contract was made ... §70A-2-615
Valad's Cecchini testified about a letter dated
March 27, 1973, wherein Valad explained that it was then encountering some unanticipated labor difficulties which resulted
in a serious slow-down in the plant.
ccknow~dged

(T. 426, Ex. 58)

Farber

having received said letter, wherein the labor

problems were explained.

His own testimony suggested that

Mallory asked Cecchinito send it.

(T. 748, Ex. 104)

More

importantly, Mallory acknowledged that it actually used this
letter to attempt to get extensions from the Government
(T. 191-2) for its own delays!

Thus, it is hard to under-

stand Mallory's contention that it was damaged by the late
shipment of heaters when it used the lateness to its own advantage and obtained contract extensions.

Valad is excused

because of the labor problems; and Mallory is estopped to claim
delay in delivery.
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POINT V
DURING THE TRIAL MALLORY'S PRESIDENT,
FARBER, REPEATEDLY CONFUSED HIMSELF,
THE TRIAL COURT AS WELL AS THE ISSUES
IN THE CASE BY TENDENTIOUSLY USING,
AS IF THEY WERE PART OF AN AGREEMENT
BETWEEN VALAD AND BROWN OR BETWEEN
MALLORY AND VALAD, THE FOLLOWING
WORDS OR PHRASES:
"CAPACITY", "DENSITY"
"LIMITSTATS"
"SPECIFICATIONS"
(IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS)
"DESIGN"
PURCHASE ORDERS
(MALLORY
AND
BROWN'S) I "PERFORMANCE STANDARDS I
"CONTINUOUS FULL VOLTAGE", HIS
"TESTS", AND "APPROVED FOR SIZE
ONLY". ACTUALLY, THESE WORDS AND
PHRASES AS USED BY FARBER WERE RELEVANT ONLY TO HIS OWN PARTISAN PURPOSES AS A WITNESS.
THEY WERE NOT
RELEVANT TO THE ONLY CONTRACT TO SELL
(EXHIBIT 83) IN THE CASE.
I

I

I

II

II

I

Is

II

First, it must be re-emphasized that there
contract between Mallory and Valad.

was no

This has been thoroughly

discussed in Point II above.
1.

No purchase order, whether Mallory's or Brown's,

was ever part of the contract between Brown and Valad, either
e:<plici tly or by incorporation by reference.

The Mallory and

Brown purchase orders were not explicit or detailed enough to
tell Valad exactly what Brown wanted to buy from Valad.
purch~se

The

orders simply served to begin discussions between

Brown and Valad.

These discussions quickly abandoned the
i

purchase orders and replaced them eventually with shop drawings.
These drawings form the basis for the agreement between Valad
and Brown since they were, by Brown, "approved for construetion".

The purchase orders were never relevant to the actual

agreement since they were only part of the preliminary negotiations which led to the contract.
Neither Brown nor Malloryat any tim0 ever explicitly
contended that any of their purchase orders had ever been
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I

accepted by Valad.

No offer by Brown was ever accepted by

Valad (T. 429-430, 436-496) until it accepted Nyman's modifications noted in Exhibit 83

(20).

This exhibit comprised

Nyman's speedletter and Valad's two shop drawings, numbered
73-119 and 73-120, and annotated in Nyman's handwriting.
(T. 35-36, 442, 452-453, 493-494)
the testimony of Cecchini

Exhibit 83

(20) confirms

(T. 425-426, 429, 431-432, 453, 475-

476, 481-482, 493) and Mccarron (T. 543-544) to the effect
that these shop drawings were structural specifications to
guide and control Valad's manufacture of the heaters ordered
by Brown in the drawings
2.
(E~~.

83)

"approved for construction".

Thus, the only contract between Brown and Valad

included approved drawings which themselves dictated

the design of the heaters.

(T.

424-432, 481, 493, 495)

Be-

cause the drawings were approved, the controversy in the record
about who had the duty to design the heaters is irrelevant.
(T. 189, 104-105, 141, 174, 188-189, 426-427, 429-431)

After

receiving Brown's purchase orders, Valad eventually "developed
a drawing".

(T. 481)

Then, "it was up to Mallory or to

Brown ... to approve the heaters or not approve the heaters" as
(T. 482)

sketched in the shop drawings.

In Mallory's Answers

to Valad's Interrogatories, Farber admitted that he had approved the Valad drawings contained in Exhibit 83 (20):
... Lee Farber reviewed these drawings in
detail with Mr. Nyman, who made notations
on these drawings and returned them to
Valad, "approved for construction subject
to comments made".
(R. 307)
3.

Exhibit 83 sets forth no performance standards,

as is clear from its contents

(T. 543-544); despite Farber's

preoccupation with that concept during his testimony.

How a

device, pictured on a drawing board, will (i.e., after conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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struction and after insertion in undescribed environmental
chambers) eventually function is always problematical.

Only

actual tests or trial-runs in loco can disclose accurately the
device's performance data.

Nyman confirmed this

(T. 279-80)

in testimony quoted infra in section 10.
It is an almost universal practice for all manufacturers of successful, time-tested products to manufacture
three types or classes thereof, exactly as Valad does.
330)

1

326-

The first class constitutes stock items, mass-produced,

repetitive as advertised in catalogues.
mi ts

(T.

For these Valad sub-

a price quotation to be either accepted or rejected by

the customer.

Its guarantee covers heat production, limited

by thermostat, workmanship and materials.

(T.

426-427, 436)

The second class is a modified version of the first class.
Valad submits a shop drawing and quotation which the customer
either accepts or rejects.

(T. 530, 542)

If the customer

accepts, it must approve the shop drawing before Valad manufactures.

(T. 427-430, 436-437, 475-476, 492-496)

Here

Valad guarantees conforrni ty with the approved drawing.

(T. 425- i

430, 437, 452, 475, 481-482, 492-493, 495-496, 524-530)

The

third class of product manufactured by Valad is designed and
invented to meet the customer's special requirements.
537)

(T. 524,

It is not a mere modification of the stock items.

This

third-class device requires from Valad invention, experimentation, and testing in the exact location and environment
wherein the customer wishes to utilize it.

It requires, es-

pecially, production of a costly prototype which 1akes the
place of a drawing and which is approved, if it is successful,
by the customer in writing.

If it is not approved, the cus-

tomer pays for all work up to that time.

Valad's guarantee
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!

explicitly and in writing covers performance such as was
rendered by the tested prototype.

(T. 427-428, 431, 437,

481, 524-525)
Nyman selected heaters from Valad's catalogue and
simply wanted a modified model of Valad's stock items.
never was any talk of a tested prototype.

There

Valad never did

and never could guarantee capability of a heater to perform
in unknown governmental equipment.

(T. 431)

At no time did

Nyman ever supply to Valad density requirements which would
be essential to a warranty of performance in a particular
manner.

(T. 431-445, 155, 172, 213-214)

Eventually, Nyman

asked Valad to construct in accordance with approved and
annotated drawings.

(Ex. 83; T. 447, 451-452)

Mallory's alleged "performance standards" (Ex. 4)
were on their face incomplete.

Furthermore, Exhibit 4 was

never given to Valad and constituted no part of the sole
agreement (Ex. 83) between Valad and Brown.
4.

A specific density factor was indeed implicit

in the structural drawings.

(Ex. 83)

It was readily com-

putable from the data set forth in those annotated structural
drawings, which the parties had "approved for construction".
Those shop drawings in Exhibit 83 are not consistent with any
other density requirement.

Q:
A:

Q:
A:
Q:
A.

... Mallory never provided any parameter for watts per square inch at any
time; is that it?
... No. No, we don't have that capability on the cartridge heaters.
I see, but it is an essential parameter for manufacture and design of the
heater?
Absolutely essential.
-- It does not appear on your purchase
order, does it?
It does not.
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Q:
A:

Even though it is essential, as you say.
Yes.
(T. 157)

Incidentally, Nyman used the wrong figure to compute watt density during his testimony.

He used 3.57 square

inches per lineal inch, instead of 3.07, the correct constant.
(T. 371, 372-375, 377)
5.

Exhibit 83 (20) contains

no language which
capaci~

explicitly calls for a mathematically precise electric

or its equivalent heat capacity; except within the ranges of
electric voltages (which vary from time to time) supplied by
the public utility (whose electricity cannot always be produced at targeted voltage); and except within the tolerance
allowed to electrical devices by the National Fire Underwritters

Code (herein sometimes "Code" or "Safety Code").

this point, McCarron's testimony was uncontradicted.

On
(T. 530-

532)
6.

The "specifications" in Mallory's government

contracts (which Valad never saw, and of which it was never
informed) are not

found

in Exhibit 83.

The Trial Court

admitted these government specifications not to show their
nature or essentials but merely to demonstrate the existence
of Mallory's contracts with the government.

(T.

6-7, 10,

13, 18-23, 185, 169)

7.

Farber made much of his bizarre interpretation

(T. 39, 42, 67-68, 153-154) of the following sentence excerpted from Mallory's unaccepted purchase order (which
never was part of any contract between Brown and Valad) :
... the sheath temperature will not exceed
+250°F. when operating at continuous full
voltage and a maximum air temperature of
+160°F. with an air velocity of 5 FPS.
(Ex. 9)
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He claimed to believe that the quoted language bespeaks a
requirement that the heater must operate continuously "at
continuous full voltage."
371-374, 418, 533, 566)

(T. 39, 42, 153-154; but see
Neither the purchase order nor its

quoted specification appear in the contract between the parties.
(Exs. 83 and 20)

Therefore, they are no part of any agreement

between Valad and Brown.
Secondly, the quotation does not say the heater
must always be heating; it merely says that when it is heating
or operating, the sheath temperature must not exceed +25Q°F.
Thirdly, continuous operation of the heater (as distinguished
from "continuous full voltage" when the heater is operating)
is belied by the government specifications, which speak of
"de-energizing the heating system" and of a "hi-low controller ... which would de-energize both the heating and cooling
systems".

Fourthly, the patent presence of many thermostats

(required by the relevant Safety Code) on the shop drawings
in Exhibit 83 necessarily calls for interruption of electricity whenever the temperature reached +250°F., at which
the thermostats were set.
8.

Farber tried repeatedly (T. 51-54, 169, 122-

123) to distinguish between "limitstats" or thermostats used
as fail-safe devices on the one hand and temperature control
built into the structure of the heater, on the other.
claimed that only the latter had his approval.

He

The indisputable

proof, however, is that the shop drawings in Exhibit 83 did
receive his approval.

Those drawings unmistakably depicted

eighteen thermostats, whose inevitable function it was to
interrupt the electrical current when the thermostatic sensors
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show +250°F.*

In any event, the tenuous distinction which

Farber, the witness, tried to make is not to be found in the
only contract (Ex. 83) between Valad and Brown.

Indeed, it is

not even stated in any purchase orders prepared by Mallory or
Brown; and of course no such purchase orders were ever accepted
by Valad or constituted parts of Exhibit 83.
9.

The Trial Court stated irrelevantly**:

"Mallory '

didn't get what they thought they were going to get ... the
thermostats were put in there in such a manner that there was
going to be an interrupted flow of current and not continuous ...
(T. 620)
confusion.

1

Nothing could show more cogently the Trial Court's
What Mallory thought they were going to get is not

the question here.

It is true that the thermostats were put

in the heaters in such a manner that there was going to be an
interrupted flow of current.

But that was required not only by

I

the Safety Code but also by the shop drawings in Exhibit 83,
which the Trial Court completely neglected both during the trial

I
!

and in its Findings of Fact.

Indeed, the Trial Court completeJ:·'

neglected all facts relating to contract formation in the case.
The Judge's remarks show that he was adrift in Farber's confusions about the real issue.
It is clear, too, that the Trial Court did not consider relevant Farber's confusion on the question whether Brown
had followed instructions in giving data to Valad.

(T. 97, 108.j

137-9)

*Actually, the thermostats were set at +225°F. to insure a
sheath no hotter than +250 °.
(T. 50 8-9)
**At the end of Mccarron' s testimony, the Trial Court aske:'
another irrelevant question (T. 561) about Valad's capability t:
build, from "proper specifications", a heater whose sheath temc· ·
erature would not exceed +250°F.
He still refused to recognize
Exhibit 83.
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This has a massive bearing on exactly what "Mallory thought
they were going to get"

(to use the Trial Court's comment).

When shown Exhibit 20 (Ex. 83) at Trial, Farber testified:
A:

... If Nyman's written instructions
pertaining to the use of thermostats is
interpreted to be the method of limiting
sheath temperature, then it is not correct ... To the best of my capability, I
am saying right now if Nyman is directincr
Valad to use thermostats as the means
of limiting sheath temperature, it is
not correct.
[Mr. Tibbals]
Is there any language
there that is amenable to such an ~n
terpretation.
There could be.
How?
Let me read, "Since each insert will
have three stats, three thermostats are
required for a total of 9 for each set.
This is detailed in your December 22,
1972 letter."
(T. 119; Ex. 83)

Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Thus, Farber admits that Brown gave Valad wrong instructions
in Brown's unaccepted purchase order.

In any event, Exhibit

83 calls for thermostats "to limit the sheath temperature".
(T.

548)
10.

Both Nyman and Mallory alleged that the approval

"for construction" was only an approval "for size".
Exhibit 83 makes no such distinction.

Of course,

Nyman's notations over

his own signature on the shop drawings in that Exhibit state
explicitly that the drawing was "approved for construction
subject to comments made" in the speedletter and in the annotations on the drawing.

(T.

339, 399, 401-402, 411)

Nyman's language in the speedletter, dated January 26, 1973,
is even more explicit:
duction ... "

(Ex. 83)

"Please proceed with immediate proActually, as that Exhibit shows, both

its drawings were marked in Nyman's handwriting "approved for
construction".

No such limitations as "approved for size only"
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..
appears anywhere in Exhibit 83.
Nyman's approval of the structural drawings in
Exhibit 83 became embarrassing to him during cross-examination,
and he tried to rationalize:
Q:

A:

Q:
A:
Q:

A:

And that was the structure that was
approved by the drawing that you people
signed; isn't that right?
The only thing we approved, or that we
sent back after discussions with Mallory
was the fact that the heaters would be of
a certain size. We had no way of examining
them [in loco] for their capability of
performing the criteria, however.
[Neither did Valad!]

***

And the layout was approved for construction
by you?
That particular layout was, but without
any possibility of analyzing the capability
of that size unit to perform the job.
Did you add that qualification in any
writing to Valad?
No. We felt that there was no qualification
to add since the particular criteria had
been provided so that the heaters would do
a particular job.
(Emphasis added)
(T. 279-280)

But the "particular criteria" were not added to Brown's
transmittal letter (Exs. 83 and 20); nor to the enclosed
drawings; nor to any other contract to sell the involved
"future goods" . .
In other words, Nyman admits he approved a layout for
size only without even knowing "the capability of that size
unit to perform the job"!

But he approved it.

He ordered

something without being concerned by its possible incapability.
But he ordered it in his speed letter.
got what he approved and ordered.
on Valad.

(Exs. 20 and 83)

He

Now he wants to put blame

And the performance "criteria" (Ex. 4) he referred

to were no part of any contract document signed by Brown or
Valad.

(T. 431, 432, 437, 481-2, 493, 495-6)

Nyman's nota-

tions on the drawings and his speedletter (Exs. 20 and 83)
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1

reveal no limitation

of approval to size only.

The shop drawings and speedletter obviously
show much more than mere size or dimentional factors.

The

shop drawings themselves (numbered 73-119 and 73-120) in
Exhibit 83 contradict Nyman; on their face and as annotated
by Nyman himself, they reveal the following specifications in
addition to dimensional
A.

requ~rements:

Shop Drawing #73-119:
(1) A total of three thermostats for each
of three inserts; i.e., nine thermostats,
whose sizes are not even mentioned.
(2) These thermostats were to function
"to limit to 250°F sheath temp." The
(3) "customer does not want holes for
mtg" [mounting] .
(4) Compliance with "Class I, Group D"
(of the National Fire Underwriters Code).
(5) Heating by "steps" as numbered by Nyman.
(6) The design and structure of the heater.
(7) The number of its heating elements.
(8) Fins on the elements.
(9) Seals on the holes.
(10) Number of "inserts" (two).
(11) The requirement that the number of holes
be kept to a minimum.
(12) The KW factor.
(13) The voltage factor.
(14) The requirement of AC (alternating
current).
(15) The three phase ("PH") requirement.
(16) The requirements "detailed in your
[Valad's] December 22, 1972 letter"
[Ex. 18].
(17) Requirement that the thermostats be set
as high as possible but not to exceed
250°F.
(18) The comment that 200°F. is "much too low,
since [the] entering air [in the duct] is
200°F. in one case."
(19) Mallory's wish to weld into duct and to
seal and mount are noted.
(20) The 13.875" and 14,375" "cutout."
(21) "Approved for construction subject to
comments as made".

B.

Shop Drawing #73-120:
(1) A total of three thermostats for each of
three inserts; i.e., nine thermostatS in
all.
(2) These thermostats were to limit sheath
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---temperature to 250°F.
(3) No holes if possible; otherwise a minimal number of holes.
(4) Seals on each hole.
(5) Compliance with "Class l, Group D" (of
the Code).
(6) Heating "steps" as numbered by Nyman,
but different from the "steps" in Drawir.g
#73-119.
(7) The design and structure of the heater.
(8) The design, structure and number of
"inserts"
(three).
(9) The number of heating elements (six).
(10) Fins on the elements.
(11) Instructions about flanges, etc.
(12) Valad must supply to Mallory a letter
stating compliance with Class I, Group
D, of the Code and-to be sent with shipment.
(13) Customer does not want three holes for
the mounting ["mtg"] .
(14) If Valad must use holes for attaching
the terminal box, the holes must be
sealed.
(15) Three thermostats for each insert "to
limit 250°F. sheath temp. since have
3 steps".
(16) "Approved for construction subject to
comments as made."
All these specifications in Exhibit 83 (20) demonstrate Nyman's and Farber's manifest error in testifying that
their "approved for construction" in Exhibit 83 was merely
approval for size.
Farber also perceived how damaging to his claim were
the shop drawings approved by himself and Nyman.
493-4; Ex. 20)

(T. 442, 452,

Farber was suddenly and conventiently disturbed

(T. 32-3) by the very shop drawings (Exs. 83 and 20) which he
had reviewed with Nyman (T. 106-7, 109-10, 118) before Nyman
sent Exhibit 83 to Valad.

The speedletter, itself, which is

part of that Exhibit, states:
120]

"The drawings [73-119 and 73-

* * * have been reviewed by Mallory Engineering

Besides, on instructions from Nyman (T. 402, 407), Valad had
mailed Exhibits 17 and 18 directly to Farber.

(T. 124-5)
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Thus, neither Farber nor Nyman spoke the truth when
they said the Valad shop drawings were approved for size only.
Drawing #73-119 presented 21, and drawing #73-120 presented 16,
non-dimentional requirements; and both showed the words:
"approved construction".
11.

(Exs. 83 and 20)

Valad's attorney questioned Mallory's Farber

very closely on the testing procedures which, Farber claimed,
showed that the heaters were deficient for the purposes of
his Government contracts.

Farber was extremely uncertain about

some of the details of the tests.

(T. 42-3)

None of the

instruments used by Mallory had been tested by the accepted
method for fixing accuracy of calibration.

(T. 49, 61)

None

of the instruments had a standard certificate traceable to the
National Bureau of Standards' calibration (T. 49, 56) which is
required for U. S. Government contracts.

(T. 227-8)

To

accept Mallory's tests as reliable one would have to believe
that not one single Rance thermostat (out of 18) , attached by
Valad to the heaters "tested" by Mallory, worked!
not only incredible, it is impossible.

This is

(T. 534, 549, 552)

The charts used to record the test data did not have the proper
grids.

(T. 229-32)

Nyman did not make any tests of his own,

but relied completely on Farber's tests.

(T.

342)

Valad tested all of the heaters before they left
the factory, in the presence of those testifying; and the
results were recorded on instruments calibrated by the National
Bureau of Standards.

(T.

506, 515, 546-7, 568-9; Ex. 86)

These results showed that all eighteen Rance thermostats* were
*Valad in the previous 15 years had manufactured about
1,000,000 heaters, all equipped with Rance thermostats (T. 504-5)
without complaint.
(T. 505-6, 507-10, 511, 513-4)
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working properly.

(T. 506, 508, 510, 549-50, 556)

Mallory's Farber testified that immediately upon
receipt of the heaters, they were inserted in the environmental
chambers for testing purposes.

(T. 39, 126)

The heaters were

installed by welding them in; but the thermostats were not
removed before the welding began.

(T. 506)

They would have

worked in Mallory's environmental chambers if they had been
properly installed (see Exhibit 86) or if they had not been
destroyed by the intense heat generated by welding.

Installa-

tion by welding could permanently distort the thermostats.
They are ruined at heat above +550°F.
causes temperatures of up to 8,000°.

The welding process
(T. 518, 554-5)

Since

these heaters bore visible burn marks in the vicinity of the
welding seals (T. 179), it is clear that the welding had a
destructive effect on the thermostats.

(T. 553-555)

This

caused them to malfunction for Mallory's tests, assuming the
tests were correctly carried out.
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POINT VI
THE HEATERS MANUFACTURED BY VALAD
FOR BROWN AND DELIVERED TO MALLORY,
ON BROWN'S INSTRUCTIONS, COMPLIED
FULLY AND EXACTLY WITH THE SPECIFICATIONS ESTABLISHED BY EXHIBIT
20(83), BROWN'S COUNTER-PROPOSAL,
WHICH VALAD HAD ACCEPTED (THUS
CONSTITUTING THE ONLY CONTRACT IN
THIS CASE WHICH IMPOSED ANY OBLIGATION UPON VALAD) .
The specifications which Valad followed (T. 543-4)
in manufacturing the 21 KW and 15 KW heaters sold to Brown
were spelled out by Brown's speedletter and the two Valad
shop drawings Nos. 73-119 and 73-120
which Carl Nyman had annotated.

(Exs. 20 and 83),

These three documents (the

speedletter and the two shop drawings aforesaid) constitute
Exhibit 83 (Exhibit 20).
(1)

The heaters' structure and construction, mandated

by Exhibit 20, were built by Valad precisely (T. 543) as that
Exhibit required.

(T. 118-20; 183-4, 495, 543-4)

to those drawings,"

"I built

(T. 543) was McCarron's uncontradicted

testimony.
(2)

The 21 and 15 KW heaters were meticulously based

on the shop drawings.

Neither Brown nor Mallory claimed that

the structural drawings were violated by the actual construetion of the heaters.

Cecchini testified that Brown got what

it had ordered.
(3)

There were three inserts, each having three thermo-

stats, due to the three "steps" in each insert.

Thus, there

was a total of 9 thermostats on the three inserts.

(T. 146-9,

151-3, 250, 282-3, 394, 410, 548-50, 554)
(4)

These thermostats were all set at 225°F., so that
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the sheath temperature could not exceed 250°F.

(T. 378,

382, 383, 479, 508-9, 554-6, 123-4, 138, 144, 146, 154, 394,
504-5, 509-10)
(5)

Valad eliminated holes for mounting and reduced

other holes to a minimum.
(6)

(T. 543-4)

The NBFU Code was complied with, as Valad's certif-

icates showed.
(7)

The thermostats were tested at Valad's factory and

they worked satisfactorily and accurately.
(8)

(T. 556, 549-50)

There were fins on the heating elements, just as

the approved shop drawing required.
(9)
(10)

There were seals on the holes.
Instructions as to the flanges had been obeyed.
Exhibit 83 (20) and its drawings as accepted and

manufactured by Valad sold future goods, not yet manufactured
nor tested.

The contract constituted by that Exhibit says

nothing at all about performance standards or criteria.

The

drawings are structural drawings approved by the parties for
construction of the heaters.

The latter were constructed in
(T. 543)

conformity with the drawings.

At no time during

the trial or in the complaint did Plaintiff contend or allege
that the heaters were not constructed in accordance with the
drawings in Exhibit 83 (20).

McCarron's testimony on this

(T. 543) is uncontradicted in the record.
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POINT VII
THE COURT'S AWARD OF $30,840.60
AS OVERHEAD OR "INDIRECT COSTS OR
DAMAGES" AGAINST VALAD IS TOTALLY
UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND
CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, U.C.A.
1953 §§70A-2-711 - 715.
The Court awarded the sum of $10,647.80 as "direct"
costs and damages sustained by the Plaintiff.

Of this sum,

$8,072 was the increased cost of "cover" of replacement heaters,
and the balance was incidental and consequential damages.
Assuming arguendo that Mallory is entitled to recover, this
would be the correct measure of damages under the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code, U.C.A. 1953 §§70.A-2-711 and 712 for a buyer
(Mallory) who is forced to "cover" when the seller (for this
purpose, Valad)

"fails to make delivery or repudiates".*

In addition, however, the Court found that Mallory
was entitled to $30,840.60 as overhead or "indirect costs or
damages"

(Finding

of Fact No. 25), despite strenuous objections

at trial by Brown and Valad.

(T. 689-702 and Exs. 100 and 102)

Both Brown and Valad objected that such "indirect damages" or
"overhead" are speculative in nature, not foreseeable by the
parties, irrevelant to the delay and legally incorrect in general.
(T. 696, 700, 702, 716)
The Uniform Commercial Code Governs the Transaction
The law in this case on damages is controlled by the
Utah Uniform Commerical Code (all citations to Utah Code Ann.,
1953, unless otherwise noted).

70A-2-102, 105 and 106(1)

*For the purpose of this point, both Mallory and Brown will
be deemed to be the "buyer" and Valad the "seller", despite the
fact that Valad's contract of sale was only with Brown. Thus,
the same
arguments
apply
both
Brown
Mallory
asLibrary
"buyers".
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.to
Funding
for digitization
provided and
by the Institute
of Museum and
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-59-

Mallory's rights against Valad are controlled by the provisions
of U.C.A. §70A-2-711, which reads in pertinent part as follows:
Where the seller (Valad or Brown) fails to
make delivery or repudiates ... the buyer
(Mallory) may cancel and ...
(a) "cover" and have damages under ...
(§712); or
(b) recover damages for non-delivery
as provided in this chapter. (Section 70A-2-7i3)
No Statutory Provision Allows Overhead Damages
In the instant case, Mallory as ultimate buyer
elected to "cover" or, basically, seek damages for the difference between the cost of the heaters Mallory purchased from
Regan after the alleged breach or "cover" price ($16,488),
and the contract price with Brown ($8,416)

(exlcuding the 12

KW heaters), together with incidental and consequential damages.
(Exs. 39-41, 102)

Mallory is absolutely limited, as a buyer,

to the difference between the contract price, and the "cover"
price.

The result would be no different under the alternative

remedy of 70A-2-713 (market price at time of breach) .

There

is absolutely no statutory provision nor equitable ground for
recovery of "overhead" sought by Mallory!
Mallory cannot claim that overhead expense is ineluded in "incidental and consequential damages" under 70A-2-715.
Incidental damages contemplate such things as inspection, trans·
portation, and storage costs.

Consequential damages have

generally been held to encompass such anticipatable claims as
lost future profits, additional interest charges, etc.

Con-

sequential damages do not encompass such uncontemplated things
as overhead or indirect damages.

17 A.L.R. 3d 1010 at 1117, §46.

Only A "Seller" Can Recover Overhead Damages
Under 70A-2-708 of the Uniform Commercial Code, onl)
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a "seller" can recover indirect or overhead damages.

This

statute provides that where the standard measure of damages for
non-acceptance or repudiation (the difference between the market
price and the unpaid contract price, together with incidental
and consequential damages), is inadequate to put the seller in
as good a position as performance would have done, then
... the measure of damages is the profit (including
reasonable overhead) which the seller would have
made from full performance by the buyer ..• (emphasis
added).
?OA-2-708
It is not a legislative oversight that gives "reasonable overhead" damages only to a seller.
this remedy.

The buyer is not given

Overhead damages are expressly reserved only to

the seller, and specifically omitted for a buyer.

Thus, the

Court erred in awarding such damages to Mallory.
The cases generally allow

only a seller to recover

"reasonable overhead", while excluding said recovery to buyers.
(See 3 A.L.R. 3d 679)

The general rule is that a seller may

recover reasonable overhead expenses when the Defendant is
responsible for Plaintiff's incuring or wasting "reasonably
foreseeable" overhead expenses.

Furthermore, the Plaintiff may

only recover said overhead expenses when they are properly
allocated with other jobs.

(3 A.L.R. 3d at

69~

In Conditioned

Air Corp. v. Rock Island M.T. Co., 114 N.W. 2d 304, 3 A.L.R. 3d
679 (Iowa 1962), the plaintiff, a seller, had a contract to furnish 206 aluminum panels for use in a school.

The panels were

shipped on defendant's truck and damaged in transit.

The Court

upheld the award of a percentage of Plaintiff's overhead expense
as damages occasioned by the necessity of replacing the damaged
panels.

The award included an allocation of payroll taxes,
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wages and salaries, workmen's compensation insurance, and
other direct labor expenses related only to this particular job
and excluded overhead expenses for other jobs upon which Plaintiff was concurrently working.

Accord:

Perfecting Service

Company v. Product Development and Sale Co., 131 S.E. 2d 9
(N.C. 1963); see also Lenobel v. Seniff, 300 N.Y.S. 226,
resettled 1 N.Y.S. 2d 1022 (1937), wherein the Court held that
awarding overhead damages would result in an awkward, cumbersome inquiry into elements of overhead of which the Defendant
had no personal knowledge and no means of meeting or refuting
Plaintiff's claims.
Mallory's Formula For Overhead Damages is Incorrect
And Grossly Unfair
Mallory is asking for a percentage of the entire overhead for the entire year, for all

Mallory's jobs, including

the ones allegedly involved in this dispute.
Ex. A and Ex. 102)

(Findings of Fact,

Mallory asked the Court below to multiply

that total overhead times the percent that Mallory's total
income bears to the income on the jobs in dispute.

The formula

might be expressed as follows:
Total
Overhead
Expense
On All,
Non-Related Jobs,
FOR YEAR

"Income" From
Disputed Job

x
Total Income
For the Year

x

Number of
days delayed*
in disputed
job by alleged
breach, as a
percentage of
the year

DAMAGES

Expressed in numbers, the formula for Job 277 (12 and 50 KW
heaters) would read as follows:

*See Point III for discussion of why this was an incorrect
standard.
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$143,893.88

x

$206,243.00

112

x
$456,229.62

$19,957.28
365

The identical formula was used to calculate the overhead or
indirect damages for each of the other two jobs in dispute.
(Exhibit A of Findings of Fact)
There is no law or evidence to support award of
damages so calculated.

Plaintiff's President, Farber, testified

that these indirect expenses were simply the cost of business
operation (overhead)

(T. 683, ls. 7-14), and that it did not

represent lost profit or lost business opportunity.

Furthermore,

he calculated them from Mallory's operating statement based upon
delays in getting out the three disputed jobs as a percentage
of the total overhead for the years '73 and '74.

(T.

686-689)

That is all that was ever said during the trial about how the
indirect damages were calculated!
The Use of "Income" As A Standard Is Not Appropriate
The indirect damages were also figured as a percentage
of total income.
this.

(Ex. 102)

There is no legal justification for

No testimony shows why "income" is a valid standard by

which to measure overhead damages even if they are allowable.
Most significantly, no testimony explains the substance
or effect of the other delays that Mallory was experiencing due
to problems not related to this lawsuit.

Farber testified

(T. 736-7) that after the replacement heaters were installed,
"We had additional problems that required some more effort on
the part of Mallory Engineering and their suppliers ... " (T. 737,
ls. 9-11)

These additional problems had nothing to do with the

problems allegedly created by Valad.

Therefore, the record con-

tains no evidence upon which the Court could logically or legally
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assign all of the overhead for the year '73 and '74 as the basis
upon which the income percentage was applied to arrive at the
indirect damages.
Use of "Income" Raises Collateral Issues
There are many collateral issues that would and
should be explored if this standard is to be applied in this
case, to wit:

Was Mallory's income abnormally low in '73 and

'74 because of the recession, which is no fault of Valad?
what other reasons was Mallory's income so low?

For

Were there

instances where Mallory's debtors had not yet paid Mallory,
thus creating abnormally low income?

Were there delays on other

jobs not related to this dispute which nevertheless increased
Mallory's overhead?

What v.ere the other independent production

and financial problems on the jobs in dispute that were not
attributable to Valad, which Mallory admitted?

(T. 736-7)

The Trial Court's Standard Of Damages
Is Purely Speculative
The effect of these and other factors on the amount of
overhead and the allocation that could be attributed to Valad's
alleged breach are purely speculative and conjectural, as well
as collateral.

This Court has repeatedly held that:

The general rule is that an award of damages
cannot properly be made on mere possibility
or conjecture, there must be a firmer foundation. That is, any such award must be supported by proof upon which reasonable minds
acting fairly thereon could believe that it is
more probable than not that damage was actually
suffered. Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Insurance,
559 P. 2d 958 at 961 (Utah 1977)
See also Graham v. Street, 2 Utah 2d 144, 270 P. 2d 456 (1954),
where the Court held:
... only such damages are recoverable as are shown
with reasonable certainty to have been sustained.
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Remote, contingent and conjectual losses will
not be considered. Sutherland on Damages, 4th
Ed., Section 1775, as cited Id. at 459.
Plaintiff's measure of damages for indirect, overhead expenses
can only be considered conjectural and speculative.
Furthermore, this Court has often held that a trial
Court must evaluate any loss suffered by the most direct,
practical and accurate method that can be employed.
Inc.

Even Olds,

v. Nielson, 22 Utah 2d 49, 448 P. 2d 709 (1968).

The

most direct and accurate approach for a buyer who is damaged is
the approach used by the Uniform Conunercial Code:

The cost of

"cover" plus incidental and consequential damages resulting
therefrom.

In this case, that sum would be under $11,000.

(Ex. 102)
Mallory's Overhead Damages Were Not Foreseeable
In addition, damages are not proper unless they may be
reasonably assumed to have been within the contemplation of the
parties as a probable result of the breach.
Galokee Corp., 522 P. 2d 428 (Kan. 1974)

Jim Mahoney v.

In other words, unless

the damages are foreseeable, there can be no recovery.

In the

case at the bar, it was never contended that either Brown or
Valad could have foreseen that the sale of the allegedly defective heaters would result in a recovery of one-fifth of the
total overhead of the Plaintiff's operation during a particular
year.
Bad Public Policy
This raises a particularly strong policy argument
against the position taken by Plaintiff:

If manufacturers of

small, component items are forced to bear the risk of incurring
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charges or overhead expenses that exceed, by many times, the
value of the component (in this case, about $7 ,000), how can,,
small manufacturer like Valad ever afford to take the risk for
such a small amount of money?

The result would be a specta1

cular jump in the costs of items such as Valad's heaters, sine.
no company could afford to assume liability for such unknown,
uninsurable, conjectural damages.
The relationship between the costs of the heaters
as charged by Valad in relation to the damages assessed (see
Ex. A, Findings of Fact) is as follows:
Price of heaters (Exs. 10, 11, 13,
15) charged to Brown by Valad:

$ 7,060.00

Price of heaters (Ex. 16) charged
to Mallory by Brown:

$ 9, 262. 00

Valad's risk (Findings of Fact) as
determined by direct damages:

$10,647.80

Valad's risk (Findings of Fact) as
determined by indirect damages:

$30,840.60

Valad's total risk:

$41,488.40

On this showing, Valad thus unknowingly undertook a risk 5.88
times as great as its $7,060 order.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant Valad seeks initially to impress upon
the Court that the lower Court never had jurisdiction in the
first place.

The line of cases beginning with Hill v. Zale

demonstrate that there simply were not sufficient contacts
to lawfully bring Valad into this action and Valad never
intentionally submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the
Court.
In

addition, Valad argues most strenuously that the

Trial Court completely ignored and misapplied the basic fundamental principles of contract law.

The law compels the con-

clusion that there was no contract between Mallory and Valad,
but that there was a contract between Brown and Valad.

Further-

more, the contract between Brown and Valad was consummated by
the meeting of the minds that occured when Brown approved the
construction drawings represented by Exhibit 20 (also Ex. 83).
The clear preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that there
was no other contract other than Exhibit 20 (83), and that
Valad manufactured the heaters strictly pursuant to the requirements of Exhibit 20.
Valad further strenuously contends that regardless
of the terms of contract between itself and Brown,

or re-

gardless of whether Mallory was a third party beneficiary of
said contract, Mallory accepted the heaters pursuant to the
terms of the Uniform Commercial Code, made no valid or effective
rejection, and later repudiated without cause the contract,
thus giving Valad the right to suspend any performance not yet
due.

The evidence also demonstrates that the "delay time''

upon which Mallory computed damages was totally unsupported
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by the evidence since Mallory clearly waived any requirement
that the heaters be shipped within six weeks of its purchase
orders.
Finally, the computation of damages itself wherein
the Trial Court awarded indirect or overhead damages is
totally unsupported by the evidence, contrary to law, and a
serious breach of sound public policy.
Defendant and Appellant Valad requests that this
Court simply reverse the judgment of the Trial Court as to
Valad, or in the alternative, grant Valad a new trial on the
issues.

Respectfully submitted,

Godfrey P. Schmidt
Robert B. Sykes
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